informal communication channels inadequate. In India, and in a similar vein, Taylor and Bain (2005, p. 273) argued that despite strong unionisation in sectors such as banking and telecommunications, a hierarchical workplace culture is typical in India's call centres where 'the absence of employee voice constitutes a democratic deficit'. Furthermore, Aguzzoli and Geary (2014) highlighted the weakness and/or absence of employee voice mechanisms in the formal labour market in Brazil. Such a deficit, alongside fragmented and ineffective unions in the informal labour market means that employees do not enjoy any protection afforded by existing employment legislation. In contrast, in China, a mixed participation model has been identified and adopted, characterised by a combination of the traditional 'iron rice bowl' paradigm with Western human resource practices (Law, Tse, & Zhou, 2003; Warner, 2004) . In contrast to China, traditional collective representation is preferred to non-union employee representation (NER) such as works councils in South Korea, as NER is considered as too weak to represent workers' rights (Kim & Kim, 2004) . In light of the small body of existing research on employee voice in developing economies, the purpose of this special issue of Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations is to explore and investigate:
• The nature of employee voice in emerging economies where silence may be the norm;
• Similarities and differences in employee voice mechanisms in emerging economies; and
• Whether voice in these contexts can be seized by workers or whether it is provided by management and/or the state. 
